Following the Beaten Track: A sociology of knowledge perspective on disinformation and its effects on democratic discourse by Nijmeijer, Rolf et al.
www.ssoar.info
Following the Beaten Track: A sociology of
knowledge perspective on disinformation and its
effects on democratic discourse
Nijmeijer, Rolf; Schünemann, Wolf; König, Tim
Erstveröffentlichung / Primary Publication
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper
Diese Arbeit wurde durch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) gefördert (Förderkennzeichen:
16DII121, 16DII122, 16DII123, 16DII124, 16DII125, 16DII126, 16DII127,16DII128 – "Deutsches Internet-Institut"). /
This work has been funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany (BMBF) (grant no.:
16DII121, 16DII122, 16DII123, 16DII124, 16DII125, 16DII126, 16DII127,16DII128 – "Deutsches Internet-Institut").
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Nijmeijer, R., Schünemann, W., & König, T. (2021). Following the Beaten Track: A sociology of knowledge perspective
on disinformation and its effects on democratic discourse. In Proceedings of the Weizenbaum Conference 2021 (pp.
1-4). Berlin: Weizenbaum Institute for the Networked Society - The German Internet Institute. https://doi.org/10.34669/
wi.cp/3.14
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Proceedings of the Weizenbaum Conference 2021 
Democracy in Flux 
Order, Dynamics and Voices in Digital Public Spheres 
 
 
Following the Beaten Track 





































The proceedings of the Weizenbaum Conference 2021 "Democracy in Flux: Order, Dynamics and 
Voices in Digital Public Spheres" have been funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Re-
search of Germany (BMBF) (grant no.: 16DII121, 16DII122, 16DII123, 16DII124, 16DII125, 
16DII126, 16DII127, 16DII128 – "Deutsches Internet-Institut"). 
 
With recent political events, disinformation has emerged as one of the apparent major threats in po-
litical debates in highly connected democracies. It looms large in the socio-political debate on the 
quality of democracy, but also in international security discourse it is perceived as one of the core 
elements of (digitally enhanced) information warfare. Thus, it is likely to shape both future measures 
of internet governance, in particular content regulation, as well as international conflict. 
 
Research on disinformation has developed techniques to detect false stories and to measure its impact 
mostly at the level of individual behaviour (Lazer et al., 2018; Gorrell et al., 2015). Other works have 
focussed on the spread of individual pieces of disinformation (Vosoughi & Aral, 2018). Several stud-
ies have put emphasis on cross-media effects of disinformation e.g., on election results (Allcott & 
Gentzkow, 2017; Jamieson, 2018). Despite widespread concerns about the so-called disinformation 
order (Bennett &Livinigston, 2018), most empirical studies feed into a growing consensus that there 
are no readily available tools to malevolent actors for significantly swaying public opinion through 
information operations (Rid, 2020; Lanoszka, 2019). However, there is only little knowledge about 
structural and persistent effects of disinformation at the societal level (Jungherr & Schroeder, 2021). 
To address those concerns and to study the structural dimension of information operations, we pro-
pose a theoretical reorientation towards a sociology of knowledge perspective. Thereby, we avoid 
individualistic misconceptions of politically relevant knowledge (Schünemann, 2018; Dunn Cavelty, 
2008). Knowledge goes beyond information. It is not just the sum of single bits of information. In-
formation needs to be interpreted based on social knowledge orders. Therefore, knowledge is not a 
feature of an individual or at its disposal but is necessarily constructed and processed in societal 
discourses.  
 
Empirical research in the field so far has paid attention mostly to the disruptive novelty of disinfor-
mation, or the alleged inaccuracy of particular pieces of information. However, it may be more illu-
minating to understand successful disinformation campaigns as informational exploits of given vul-
nerabilities in targeted discursive formations. Instead of expecting disinformation to change public 
opinion, we conceive it as strategically confirming embedded social knowledge orders. For example, 
disinformation campaigns frequently propagate various salient and sensitive narratives simultane-
ously, which are often mutually contradictory, but share an inflammatory nature (Bradshaw & How-
ard, 2019). We hypothesize that information operations utilise and reinforce pre-existing issues and 
fault lines in a society to maximise disruptive effects. Such a revised conception might help to explain 
the heterogeneous set of actors and motivations behind disinformation campaigns within and across 
countries, it can improve attribution assessments based on a cui-bono-logic and would help to better 
grasp the catalytic effects of attentional mechanisms in (digital) media ecosystems.  
 
This paper empirically tests the aforementioned hypothesis through a thorough analysis of corpora of 
news articles from Germany and France published between 1 January 2019 and 30 June 2019. These 
dates comprise the culmination and aftermath of the 2019 European elections campaign, which has 
been identified as a prime target for foreign actors to conduct large-scale disinformation campaigns 
(European Parliament Resolution 2019/2810(RSP), 2019). Since it is the objective of this paper to 
identify the ebb-and-flow of a disinformation campaign, and how it relates to public discourse, the 
suspected disinformation corpus is collected from Russia Today (RT). This news outlet has been 
identified as one arm of the Russian influence apparatus abroad, which includes disinformation op-
erations (Elswah & Howard, 2020). RT is a particularly useful case to study due to its presence in 
multiple countries and multilingual content. This allows for comparisons on country- and language-
 
level, which will help in identifying any potential country-specific features of disinformation cam-
paigns. The two countries were chosen because in comparative studies (EUvsDisinfo, 2021) they 
appeared as the main targets of information operations attributed to Russia. Moreover, there is a Ger-
man and French version of RT available. It seems particularly illuminating to assess disinformation 
campaigns in non-Anglophone countries, since much of the existing literature has already covered 
the latter extensively. In order to gather a representative sample of mainstream news media, which 
also serves as a representation of the respective general public discourse, we built corpora with news 
articles from one regular newspaper and one tabloid newspaper: Die Welt and Bild for Germany, and 
Le Figaro and France Soir for France. This yields a dataset that we think is both manageable and 
sufficiently representative for the media landscapes in both countries. 
 
The articles used in the dataset were scraped from the German and French websites of RT, as well as 
from the France Soir website, while the articles from Die Welt, Bild and Le Figaro were downloaded 
from LexisNexis. These datasets are curated and analysed using R tools for text-mining. We use 
Structural Topic Modelling for our analysis, as it allows to estimate covariate effects on topic distri-
bution for both the various news outlets, as well as the timeline in which trends and/or clusters of 
topics emerge. Coming from our social-constructivist perspective, we expect RT information opera-
tions to align to socio-culturally specific patterns of public discourse. Therefore, we expect cross-
country variation in topical orientation. Moreover, as to the temporal variation, we expect RT to ‘fol-
low’ the newspapers on divisive topics, rather than ‘planting the seeds’ for a dominant topic. We 
hypothesise that RT will do so in an amplifying manner, using more galvanising language than the 
quality newspapers in the dataset.  
 
Preliminary findings from the German case study suggest that RT stands out most from the main-
stream newspapers through its substantial coverage of issues that are salient and likely to evoke strong 
emotions. Topics that RT covers more extensively than its more mainstream counterparts include 
migration, migrant criminality, Brexit, alternative perspectives on politics and Russia. Conversely, 
less emotionally charged topics, such as those related to finance, health and party politics, receive far 
less attention from RT than from mainstream news outlets. These findings are commensurate with 
the expectation that disinformation latches onto potentially disruptive issues present within the soci-
ety that it targets. Further analysis on topical orientation and publication timeline should give more 
insight into the relationship between cases news outlets. These findings will be presented in the final 
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